Definitions
What sovereign AI means
Sovereignty in AI is not a single thing. It is a spectrum of control requirements, and different organisations land at different points on that spectrum depending on their data classification, regulatory environment, and operational context.
At one end is cloud deployment with contractual data residency: your data stays in an EU data centre but the inference service is operated by a US company subject to US law. This satisfies some residency requirements but not sovereignty ones. At the other end is fully air-gapped on-premises deployment: the model, the compute, the key management, and the data all live inside a physical boundary that has no external network connections. Nothing crosses a wire that you do not control.
Between those extremes sit sovereign cloud deployments (government-operated cloud infrastructure with your own compute), private cloud with encryption at inference (cloud compute but FHE ensures the provider cannot read the data), and on-premises with selective cloud connectivity (inference on-premises, model updates over a verified air gap).
In a standard on-premises deployment, you trust the hardware and the operating system not to leak data. If either is compromised, the plaintext data is exposed. FHE removes that dependency. The data is encrypted before it enters the inference pipeline. The model computes on ciphertext. Even a fully compromised inference server cannot read the data it is processing. Sovereignty with FHE does not require trusting the hardware to be uncompromised. It requires only that the cryptographic keys are secure.
Applicability
When sovereignty is required
Four conditions independently create a requirement for sovereign or air-gapped AI deployment.
| Condition | Examples | Minimum deployment tier |
|---|---|---|
| Data classification prohibits external transmission | Classified government documents, ITAR-controlled defence technical data, intelligence community workloads | Full air-gap required |
| Regulatory data residency with sovereignty requirement | EU GDPR combined with national data localisation laws, UK OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE, Canadian Protected B | Sovereign cloud or on-premises |
| Operational requirement: disconnected environments | Naval vessels, forward operating bases, underground facilities, remote sites with no reliable connectivity | Full air-gap required |
| Supply chain risk requires hardware control | Critical national infrastructure operators, payment processing, healthcare data lakes | On-premises with FHE for inference isolation |
Understanding which condition applies to your organisation determines the architecture. A hospital under GDPR in Germany needs a different deployment than an army unit operating in a disconnected forward base, even though both might say they need "sovereign AI."
What you are defending against
The air-gapped threat model
Air-gapped environments eliminate most network-based attack vectors but create a distinct set of threats that standard cloud deployments do not face.
Cryptographic standards
FIPS 140-3 for AI key management
FIPS 140-3 is the successor to FIPS 140-2 as the US federal standard for cryptographic module validation. For AI deployments in US government environments, FIPS 140-3 validated modules are required for any cryptographic operation on sensitive data. This is not optional: using a non-validated module is a finding in any FedRAMP or STIG assessment.
For a VectaX sovereign deployment, FIPS 140-3 applies to three operations: FPE key generation and storage, RBAC key generation and storage, and the key wrapping operations when keys are moved between systems during provisioning.
What FIPS 140-3 requires in practice
The standard has four security levels. Level 1 is software-only implementation. Level 2 requires evidence of tampering (tamper-evident seals). Level 3 requires tamper resistance and identity-based authentication. Level 4 is required only in the most extreme environments. For most government and regulated enterprise deployments, Level 2 or Level 3 HSMs are the requirement.
| Key operation | FIPS 140-3 requirement | Practical implementation |
|---|---|---|
| FPE key generation | Key must be generated inside a validated module using approved algorithm (AES-FF1 or AES-FF3-1) | Run sdk.metadata.generate_key() on a system configured to use HSM for cryptographic operations |
| FPE key storage | Key must never exist in plaintext outside the validated module boundary | Store key handle in application; key bytes remain in HSM and are used via PKCS#11 interface |
| RBAC key generation | Same as FPE: generated in validated module, stored as handle | sdk.rbac.generate_user_secret_key() with HSM-backed crypto provider |
| Key distribution to users | Keys distributed to authorised users must be wrapped (encrypted) using a key-encryption key that stays in the HSM | Key ceremony with dual-control: two custodians required to unwrap any key for distribution |
| Key destruction | FIPS 140-3 specifies zeroisation procedures; key must be verifiably destroyed | HSM zeroisation command with audit log entry confirming destruction |
A common misconception is that using a FIPS-validated algorithm in software satisfies FIPS 140-3. It does not. FIPS 140-3 validates the cryptographic module, not just the algorithm. Python's hashlib using SHA-256 is not FIPS 140-3 compliant even though SHA-256 is a FIPS-approved algorithm. You need a validated HSM or a FIPS-validated software module (for example, BoringCrypto in FIPS mode). Check the NIST CMVP list for currently validated modules.
Reference design
Reference architecture for sovereign VectaX deployment
This architecture applies to an on-premises deployment with no external network connectivity. All components live inside the physical security boundary.
- Hardware Security Module (FIPS 140-3 Level 3 minimum for government, Level 2 for regulated enterprise)
- Generates and stores all VectaX FPE keys and RBAC master keys
- PKCS#11 interface used by VectaX for key operations
- Dual-control access: two custodians required for any key management operation
- Complete audit log of all key operations, tamper-evident
- Network-isolated: accessible only from the inference tier via private network segment
- On-premises GPU or CPU servers running the inference workload
- VectaX SDK installed from verified offline package (no pip install from internet)
- Receives encrypted inputs from the data tier; never sees plaintext
- Uses HSM-stored keys via PKCS#11 for FPE operations on metadata
- Returns encrypted outputs to the application tier
- No egress network capability: firewalled from all external connectivity
- On-premises AgentIQ instance for policy evaluation (no cloud API call required)
- Receives user queries, evaluates against deployed policies before routing to inference tier
- Logs all policy decisions to the on-premises audit log store
- User-facing interface (web UI, API, or agent endpoint)
- On-premises vector database (ChromaDB, pgvector, or Qdrant in local mode)
- Holds only VectaX-encrypted embeddings; no plaintext vectors stored
- Encrypted at rest using hardware-accelerated AES-256 (FIPS-validated)
- Access controlled by the inference tier only; application tier cannot query directly
Implementation
VectaX in offline environments
The VectaX SDK cryptographic operations are local. FHE, vector encryption, and FPE do not require network calls during encryption or decryption. The one component that normally requires network access is RBAC key management, which calls the Mirror Security API to generate and scope user keys.
For air-gapped deployments, RBAC keys are pre-generated inside the secure boundary during a provisioning ceremony and stored in the HSM. The SDK then uses those stored keys without making further API calls.
from mirror_sdk.core.mirror_core import MirrorSDK, MirrorConfig
from mirror_sdk.core.models import VectorData
# In a sovereign deployment, point the SDK to your on-premises Mirror instance
# This instance runs inside your physical boundary with no cloud dependency
config = MirrorConfig(
api_key="your-on-premises-api-key",
server_url="https://mirror-api.internal.yourorg.gov", # on-prem URL
telemetry_enabled=True,
policy_eval_enabled=True,
# Longer polling interval is fine in air-gapped environments
# policy updates happen via the provisioning process, not dynamically
polling_interval=3600
)
sdk = MirrorSDK(config)
# VectaX encryption operations are local
# This call makes no network request
embedding = [0.12, 0.45, 0.78] # your actual embedding vector
vector = VectorData(vector=embedding, id="doc_classified_001")
encrypted = sdk.vectax.encrypt(vector) # purely local crypto operation
# Decryption is also local
decrypted = sdk.vectax.decrypt(encrypted) # no network call
print("VectaX FHE operations complete with no external network dependency")
In a truly air-gapped environment, pip install cannot reach PyPI. Download the mirror-sdk and mirror_enc packages in advance on a connected machine, verify their hashes against the published checksums, transfer the verified packages across the air gap using your organisation's approved media transfer process, and install from the local copy. The same process applies to all dependencies.
Key lifecycle
Key management without cloud connectivity
Key provisioning in an air-gapped environment is a procedural process as much as a technical one. It happens during a controlled key ceremony and must be documented in detail.
from mirror_sdk.core.mirror_core import MirrorSDK, MirrorConfig
# Key ceremony: run this on the HSM-connected provisioning workstation
# inside the physical security boundary
# Two authorised custodians must be physically present
config = MirrorConfig.from_env()
sdk = MirrorSDK(config)
# Step 1: Generate FPE key inside HSM
# The key material never leaves the HSM
# The SDK returns a handle (reference), not the key bytes
fpe_key_handle = sdk.metadata.generate_key()
print(f"FPE key generated. Handle: {fpe_key_handle[:8]}... (stored in HSM)")
# Step 2: Generate RBAC master policy
sovereign_policy = {
"roles": ["analyst", "senior_analyst", "supervisor"],
"groups": ["intelligence", "operations"],
"departments": ["classified_division"]
}
sdk.set_policy(sovereign_policy)
# Step 3: Pre-generate RBAC keys for all authorised users
# Keys are generated now, stored in HSM, distributed to users via secure process
# No runtime API call is needed when users access the system
analyst_key = sdk.rbac.generate_user_secret_key({
"roles": ["analyst"],
"groups": ["intelligence"],
"departments": ["classified_division"]
})
supervisor_key = sdk.rbac.generate_user_secret_key({
"roles": ["analyst", "supervisor"],
"groups": ["intelligence", "operations"],
"departments": ["classified_division"]
})
# Step 4: Store keys in HSM under individual user key-encryption keys
# Each user's RBAC key is wrapped under their personal KEK in the HSM
# Users authenticate to the HSM to unwrap their key at session start
print("Key ceremony complete. All keys generated and stored in HSM.")
print("Ceremony must be documented and signed by both custodians.")
After the ceremony, the HSM holds all key material. The provisioning workstation retains only key handles, not key bytes. Key handles are configuration items, not secrets. The handles are deployed to the inference tier servers as part of normal configuration management.
Local policy enforcement
AgentIQ policy enforcement without cloud connectivity
In a standard deployment, the AgentIQ policy engine calls the Mirror Security API to evaluate policies. In a sovereign deployment, you run an on-premises AgentIQ instance that handles policy evaluation entirely within the physical boundary.
The on-premises instance receives your deployed policies during the provisioning process. Policy updates in a sovereign environment go through the same controlled change management process as any other software update: verified, approved, tested in a parallel environment, then deployed via the approved media transfer process.
from mirror_sdk.ops.mirror_decorators import policy_monitor
from mirror_sdk.core.mirror_core import MirrorConfig
# All requests go to the on-premises AgentIQ instance
# No call ever reaches the internet
config = MirrorConfig(
api_key="on-premises-key",
server_url="https://agentiq.internal.yourorg.gov",
telemetry_enabled=True,
policy_eval_enabled=True
)
@policy_monitor(name="sovereign_agent_policy", mirror_config=config)
async def classified_query_handler(user_query: str) -> str:
"""
Handles queries against classified document corpus.
Policy evaluation runs on the on-premises AgentIQ instance.
Retrieval runs against the on-premises encrypted vector store.
Inference runs on local GPU with VectaX FHE.
No component of this function reaches an external network.
"""
# Your sovereign inference logic here
# All components are on-premises
return "[sovereign inference result]"
Real-world tradeoffs
Operational considerations
Sovereign AI deployments involve tradeoffs that cloud deployments do not. Understanding them before you commit to the architecture prevents expensive surprises.
| Consideration | Cloud deployment | Sovereign deployment |
|---|---|---|
| Model updates | Transparent; provider manages model versioning | Manual process: verify, approve, transfer across air gap, test, deploy. Add 2 to 4 weeks to any model update. |
| Inference latency | Low; optimised cloud hardware | Higher; depends on your on-premises GPU capacity. FHE adds latency versus plaintext inference (factor of 2 to 10 depending on operation). |
| Software updates | Automatic or opt-in | All updates must go through the air gap process. A critical security patch for mirror-sdk requires the same approval cycle as any other update. |
| Key rotation | API call; can be automated | Requires physical access to HSM and two custodians. Plan rotation events as scheduled operations with 48 hours notice minimum. |
| Capacity scaling | Elastic; add compute in minutes | Physical procurement; add compute in weeks to months. Plan capacity for peak load at build time. |
| Failure recovery | Provider manages redundancy | You manage redundancy. HSM failure without a backup HSM means key loss. Always deploy HSM pairs. |
In a sovereign deployment, losing the HSM without a backup means losing all key material. All data encrypted under those keys becomes permanently unreadable. Always deploy HSMs in pairs with synchronised key material. The backup HSM must be stored in a separate physical location under the same physical security controls as the primary, not in the same rack. Test HSM failover before you need it.
Regulatory mapping
Compliance mapping for sovereign AI
| Framework | Relevant requirement | How this architecture addresses it |
|---|---|---|
| FedRAMP IL4 / IL5 | Controlled Unclassified Information and national security systems require GovCloud or on-premises deployment with specific isolation controls | Addressed Air-gapped on-premises with FIPS 140-3 HSM meets IL4/IL5 isolation requirements. FHE provides additional assurance beyond standard IL5 controls. |
| ITAR | Technical data related to defence articles must remain with US persons and facilities; cannot be processed by foreign-controlled cloud infrastructure | Addressed Air-gapped on-premises in ITAR-registered facility. FHE means foreign-manufactured hardware components cannot read ITAR data. |
| GDPR Article 44-46 (data transfers) | Personal data cannot be transferred to third countries without adequate protection; cloud inference often constitutes a transfer | Addressed On-premises within EU jurisdiction with no data egress. Sovereignty model eliminates the transfer question entirely. |
| UK OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE | Sensitive government data must be processed in environments meeting specific security controls; commercial public cloud requires additional controls | Addressed On-premises deployment in UK-controlled facility satisfies the baseline. FIPS 140-3 HSM supports CESG key management requirements. |
| EU AI Act Article 9 (risk management) | High-risk AI systems must have risk management systems including security controls | Partial FHE and AgentIQ policies address technical controls. Risk management documentation and human oversight requirements are procedural. |
| NIST AI RMF (Govern, Map, Measure) | AI risk governance including security of the AI pipeline | Addressed FHE provides the Govern and Map controls for data security. AgentIQ telemetry provides Measure evidence. |
Common questions
FAQ
Enterprise Agentic AI track complete
You have built a production agent policy chain with AgentIQ and designed the architecture for sovereign AI deployment with air-gapped FHE. These are the most demanding configurations Mirror Security supports. Contact the team to discuss your specific deployment requirements.